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THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI
IN NORTH DAKOTA
CHARLES LIEBERT CRUM*
I.

Introduction: Certiorariat Common Law

The writ of certiorari is an ancient and venerable procedural device which comes down to us from the antiquity
of feudal times and remains as an ill-adjusted common law
remnant in the midst of North Dakota's codified law. The
practitioner is to be excused for looking askance at it. Indeed, it is probable that certiorari is rarely thought of in
terms of state law; most attorneys seem to connect it with
the United States Supreme Court and its use by that tribunal
as a screening device for the selection of cases.
Certiorari is, however, an important part of the law of
North Dakota dealing with administrative agencies. Enmeshed as it is in the midst of a group of constitutional and
statutory provisions which are in many respects inharmonious, the writ has developed into an extraordinarily complex
legal mechanism. This is unfortunate in many ways. Because of its unusual characteristics, certiorari's intricacies
have played a major, if not decisive, part in the decision of
many of the important administrative law cases which have
been decided by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. To understand thoroughly the law of certiorari in North Dakota,
and why it has developed as it has, it is necessary first to
consider briefly its common law background.
Certiorari is ordinarily defined as a writ issuing out of
a court directed to some inferior court or other tribunal or
officer, generally exercising judicial functions, requiring the
certification and return to the issuing court of the record of
some proceeding then pending or terminated, to the end that
the proceedings may be reviewed by the issuing court.' It is
not a procedurally flexible remedy in the sense that it can be
used to command a lower court or officer to take some affirmative action or to refrain from doing so; all that can be
done by means of the writ is to have some order or action
already taken set aside or quashed.! And it is a remedy which
may be granted or withheld in the discretion of the court for
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
In re Dance, 2 N.D. 184, 49 N.W. 733 (1891); 1 Holdsworth, History
of English Law 218 (1927); Goldberg, The Extraordinary Writs and The
Review of Inferior Court judgments, 36 Calif.L.Rev. 558, 562 (1948);
Goodnow, The Writ of Certiorari, 6 Pol.Sci.Q. 493 (1891) (a basic discussion); Comment, 4 Miami L.Q. 367 (1950).
2Molander
v. Swenson, 54 N.D. 391, 210 N.W. 9 (1926).
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a variety of reasons, e.g. laches.' In the exercise of its discretion, however, the court will ordinarily be governed by a
number of fairly well established rules growing out of the
character of certiorari as an extraordinary remedy and its
history of develcpment at common law.
Certiorari developed in the early days of the common
law in England, when the king as the repository of the nation's sovereign powers was considered the fountain of all
justice." Because the king was so considered, it was only natural that he should exercise his prerogative of doing justice
by superintending and watching over the conduct of the
English court system. The chief instrument through which
this supervision was effected was the king's own court, the
Court of King's Bench.'
To the Court of King's Bench, then, came the suitors who
were unable to obtain justice in the regular courts. And
from the King's Bench the crown exercised its powers by
issuing various writs-the great writ of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari.' These
writs in the course of time became known as prerogative
writs.7 Blackstone, discussing this aspect of King's Bench
jurisdiction, waxes eloquent: "The jurisdiction of this court
is very high and transcendent. It keeps all inferior jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority, and may either
remove the proceedings to be determined here, or prohibit
their progress below . . .It commands magistrates and others
to do what their duty requires, in every case where there
is no specific remedy."
The Court of King's Bench thus acquired a superintending control over the lower courts of the English system.' But
Goodnow, supra Note 1, at 501-02. See also Morrissey v. Blasky, 22 N.D.
430, 134 N.W. 319 (1912); Schouweiler v. Allen, 17 N.D. 510, 117
N.W. 866 (1908).
4 Goodnow, supra note 1, at 493.
5 For discussion of this power in the North Dakota courts, see State ex rel.
Lemke v. District Court, 49 N.D. 27, 41-42, 186 N.W. 381, 386-87
(1921); State ex rel.Moore v. Archibald, 5 N.D. 359, 372-73, 66 N.W.
234, 239-40 (1902); State ex rel. Fourth National Bank v. Johnson, 103
Wis. 591, 79 N.W. 1081 (1899).
This pre-eminent position was later lost when the court was integrated
into the High Court of Justice. 1 Holdsworth, op cit. supra note 1, at
210-11.
Goodnow, supra note 1, at 493; 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law
92 (1908). Certiorari in England is still discussed under the title of
"Crown Practice" in 10 Halsbury, Laws of England 155 et seq. (1909).
3 BI.Com. *42.
This supervisory power was also exercised over the machinery of local
government, particularly the English justices of the peace, who exercised
many powers which would not today be considered judicial. The fact foreshadowed the use of certiorari as a means of controlling administrative
action in this country. Goodnow, supra note 1, at 5 15; 10 Holdsworth,
op cit supra note 1, at 155, 244-46.
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a tribunal in which the king himself occasionally sat exercised more authority than that. The cases which affected
the king himself, as well as the problems which affected the
important interests of the kingdom as a whole, were brought
before it as original matters." In such cases the Court of
King's Bench exercised original as well as superintending
jurisdiction.'
While statements may be found on both sides of the argument, the best authority on the point appears to indicate
that as it was used in England, the writ of certiorari was not
limited to errors which were "jurisdictional" in character,
but could be used to quash any judgment based on errors of
law appearing on the record and errors of jurisdiction whether
they appeared on the record or not." However, from time to
time parliament, in various statutes, inserted provisions forbidding the removal of summary convictions into the Court
of King's Bench on certiorari. It was held that these did
not apply where the proceeding was invalidated by jurisdictional error, and as a result the mistaken belief spread in this
country that certiorari could be used to test only jurisdictional mistakes."
The consequences of this two-fold development-that
King's Bench possessed supervisory and original as well as
appellate jurisdiction, and that the mistaken belief arose that
certiorari lay only to test questions of jurisdiction-remain
very much with us today, as the subsequent discussion will
make clear.
II.

Certiorariin North Dakota: Trial on the Record.

As is true with so much of North Dakota's law, the provisions dealing with certiorari found in the present code stem
from the Code of Civil Procedure prepared by David Dudley
Field of New York in 1848." Procedurally, certiorari's function remains unchanged from its use at common law. It still
commands the party to whom it is addressed to prepare and
certify to the issuing court a record of the proceedings, so
that they may be reviewed by the court."
10 See State ex rel. Moore v. Archibald, 5 N.D. 359, 372-73, 66 N.W. 234,
239-40 (1902); Goodnow, supra note 1, at 494-95.
"1
1 Holdsworth, op cit supra note 1, at 205.
12
Jackson v. People; 9 Mich. 111 (1860) and cases cited; Goldberg, supra
note 1, at 562 et seq.; Hart, An Introduction to Administrative Law 55
(2d ed. 1950). But see Goodnow, supra note 1, at 527-30.
13 Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property § 136 (1928).
1
N.D. Rev. Code 1895, preface v; Viesselman, Dakota Practice § 2 (1930).
N.D. Rev. Code § 32-3304 (1943).
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When the statutes were first enacted, no provision was
made for supplementing the bare provisions of the record,
although it was provided that if "the return to the writ be defective, the court may order a further return to be made."'
The early case of In re Dance" laid down the proposition emphatically that the trial on a writ of certiorari was on the
record alone. The case involved the validity of a judgment
rendered by a justice of the peace. The applicant for certiorari contended the judgment was void because the justice of
the peace had adjourned court indefinitely before rendering
a decision, thereby losing jurisdiction. This fact was not
shown on the original record, but a supplemental statement
obtained from the justice after his term of office had expired
disclosed its existence. The court held that the supplemental
statement could not be considered. "To permit the record to
be impeached by the recollections of the justice is, in effect,
contradicting the return by parol evidence; and there is such
an avalanche of authority against that proceeding that no
one would claim that it could be done."'
The obvious rigidity inherent in the decision prompted
a change in the law. Four years after the decision was rendered, a provision was included in the Revised Code of 1895
permitting the impeachment of the record." The code was
also amended to provide that the writ might be issued to
officers whose term of office had expired," and that supplemental proofs might be used where no record, or an insufficient record, was available.'
III.

Statutory Conditions for Use of Writ

As it now stands, the code specifies that a "writ of certiorari shall be granted by the supreme court or district court
when an officer, board, tribunal, or inferior court has exceeded the jurisdiction of such officer, board, tribunal or inferior court, as the case may be, and there is no appeal, nor,
in the judgment of the court, any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy, and also when, in the judgment of the
court, it is deemed necessary to prevent miscarriage of justice."
Thus, several formal conditions must be met before
the writ can be obtained in the ordinary case: (1) there must
"

Dak. Comp. Laws 1887,
5514.
2 N.D. 184, 49 N.W. 733 (1891).
Id. at 193, 49 N.W. at 735.
N.D. Rev. Code § 32-3310 (1943).
N.D. Rev. Code § 32-3305 (1943).
N.D. Rev. Code § 32-3307 (1943). But see Red River Valley Brick Company v. Grank Forks, 27 N.D. 8, 30, 145 N.W. 725, 729 (1914).
" N.D. Rev. Code §32-3301 (1943).

1T
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be an official act in excess of jurisdiction; (2) there must
be no appeal from that act; (3) there must be no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. The effect of the provision
as to miscarriage of justice will be discussed hereinafter, but
it may be pointed out that in form it is not a condition but an
alternative ground for the issuance of the writ. That these
conditions do not always apply will become manifest from
the later discussion, but in the ordinary application for the
writ, particularly in the district court, they must be present.
It is to be noted that these conditions are imposed conjunctively-that is, there must be an act in excess of jurisdiction and a lack of appeal or other adequate remedy. The
courts have held repeatedly that although a lower court may
exceed its jurisdiction in entering an order, that fact alone
is not sufficient to authorize the use of certiorari when there
is a remedy by appeal.' In the discussion which follows, it
is important to bear in mind that in those situations where
the court has reviewed an act in excess of jurisdiction, it has
simultaneously been forced to consider the question of whether an appeal or other adequate remedy existed.
IV.

What Constitutes an Excess of Jurisdiction?

Despite the fact that the court must always decide the
issue of appealability in order to reach the question of whether
a given official act is or is not in excess of jurisdiction, a substantial number of decisions involving this point have come before the court. This result has been reached, contrary to the experience of other jurisdictions,' because of an unusual development in the law of North Dakota which has tended to increase
the importance of certiorari as a mechanism for the review of
administrative action. The general rule adopted in England
with respect to the writ limited certiorari to instances where
the act to be reviewed was of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature." As certiorari developed in this country a majority of
states followed English practice in this regard. Difficulties
were soon experienced, growing out of the problem, familiar
to all students of administrative law, which is encountered
McLean v. McLean, 69 N.D. 406, 287 N.W. 495 (1939); Sell v. Davis,
61- N.D. 130, 237 N.W. 307 (1931); Squire v. County Court, 25 N.D.
468, 141 N.W. 1135 (1913); State ex rel. Noggle v. Crawford, 24 N.D.
8, 138 N.W. 2 (1912); St.P.,M. & M.Ry. v. Blakemore, 17 N.D. 67,
114 N.W. 730 (1908); Lewis v. Gallup, 5 N.D. 384, 67 N.W. 137
(1896).
Goldberg, supra note 1, at 565.
Rex v. Woodhouse (1906) 2 K.B. 501; Regina v. Salford Overseers
(1852) 18 Q.B. 687, 118 Eng.Rep. 259; 10 Halsbury, Laws of England
171 (1909).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

in attempting to define what actually constitutes a judicial as
distinguished from a legislative, executive or administrative
act."
When the statutes concerning certiorari were first
adopted in the Territory of Dakota, however, they contained
no words of limitation restricting the use of the writ to cases
where judicial or quasi-judicial acts were involved.", The significance of this omission was not lost upon the North Dakota
court when the statutes were later carried over into the state's
law. In State ex rel. Johnson v. Clark' the precise issue of
how far the writ extended iame before it for determination.
The city of Minot, desiring to annex territory outside its corporate boundaries, published notice of annexation and entered
an order purporting to annex the land. A writ of certiorari
was obtained from the district court to review the action, on
the ground that irregularities in the publication of notice had
taken place. The defense was that the order of annexation
was legislative in character and that the court had no authority to review it on certiorari.
The court concurred in the view that the order was legislative. However, it held specifically that in view of the language of the statute it had authority to review by certiorari
acts of an "administrative, legislative, judicial, and other"
nature." South Dakota, possessing a similar statute, had
reached the same result earlier." The effect of a decision of
this type, of course, was bound to be far reaching. There are
a multitude of government agencies-administrative boards,
city councils and the like-from whose actions no direct appeal is given to the courts." Often one has the remedy of a
collateral suit, but this does not grant relief as to the precise
subject matter of a void official order or action, and as the
court had early pointed out, the right to relief which a person whose rights are infringed by such an order possesses is
the right to have the order itself set aside, not a right to colGoodnow, supra note 1, at 506 et seq.; Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals.
36 Harv.L.Rev. 405, 411 (1923); Stason, Cases and Materials on Administrative Tribunals 67.69 (2d ed. 1947).
See text, Note 22.
= 21 N.D. 517, 131 N.W. 715 (1911).
Cf. Glaspell v.Jamestown, 11 N.D. 86, 88 N.W. 1023 (1902) (statute
authorizing district courts to exclude territory from city held unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power to court).
21 N.D. at 528, 131 N.W. at 719.
State ex rel. Dollard v. Hughes County, 1 S.D. 292, 46 N.W. 1127 (1890)
(acts of county commissioners in setting up polling places held reviewable
on certiorari though legislative in character).
The effect of the Administrative Agencies Uniform Practice Act on what
authorities are reviewable by certiorari is discussed infra, text to note 119.
2T
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lateral relief from it." While certiorari has been used to review such orders even in other states, the review has generally been substantially hampered by the fact that the action
under consideration must always be of a judicial or quasijudicial nature." At one stroke the North Dakota court attempted to bypass these difficulties, transforming certiorari
into an important part of the state's developing administrative law.
But while the court had granted a right to review which
was far-reaching in its coverage, it must be pointed out that
there is a distinction between the right to a review and the
scope or extent of the review once it is granted.' The question
which remained was how far this review was to extend. The
Clark decision attempted to answer this: "The questions for
consideration are simply these: Have they jurisdiction and
have they proceeded according to law in the exercise thereof?
If they have, then it matters not whether the act complained
of is judicial, administrative, or legislative. As to the wisdom
of their conclusions thus legally given.., we can have nothing
to say. '
Several things may be noted about this decision. In the
first place, the court was clearly looking forward to the develment of administrative law in the state and was attempting
to provide a basis for future judicial supervision over the administrative agencies, boards and officials involved. It was
planning to see to it that the agencies were held within proper
limits while still retaining as much freedom and flexibility of
action as possible. Secondly, the court was speaking of the
questions for consideration, not the question. The emphasis
was on the plural. In order to take official action which was
safe from certiorari, the court had stated, two factors had to
concur: (1) a government agency with jurisdiction which
(2) had proceeded according to law. The court had drawn a
distinction between the presence of jurisdiction and its proper exercise."
33

4

37

Enderlin Bank v. Rose, 4 N.D. 319, 58 N.W. 314 (1894); State ex rel.
Clyde v. Lauder, 11 N.D. 136, 90 N.W. 564 (1901).
Goodnow, supra note 1, at 505-14.
Larson, The Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact," 15 Temp.L.Q. 185, 20405 (1941).
21 N.D. at 528, 131 N.W. at 719.
See the remarks of Judge Bronson in Baker v. Lenhart, 50 N.D. 30, 70,
195 N.W. 16, 32 (1923): "Want of jurisdiction must be distinguished
from excess of jurisdiction . . . This court has pointed out a path of
distinction in certiorari proceedings. It has recognized that the statute
in its prescription has connected the phrase 'excess of jurisdiction' with
a failure to proceed according to law . . .In other words, although
there may be no want of jurisdition in a certiorari proceeding, yet, acts
in excess of jurisdiction not consonant with law may appear in the course
thereof."

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

The authorities make it clear that these two tests often
tend to merge into one another. "The question of regularity
of proceedings," says Professor Goodnow, "is . . . a part of
the general question of jurisdiction."" In a similar vein, the
Restatement of Judgments lists four main categories of limitations upon the power of a tribunal to render a binding judgment: (a) a tribunal may lack jurisdiction because the parties
or property or status which it is sought to affect are not
within the control of the state," as witness the case where a
court seeks to grant a divorce to a person not domiciled within
the state;'
(b) it may lack jurisdiction because it fails to
employ reasonable methods bf notification and give a reasonable opportunity to be heard to persons affected;4' (c) it may
lack jurisdiction because it does not possess competency to
deal with the question before it,' as in the case of a justice
of the peace who purports to try title to real property, or
a workman's compensation board which attempts to grant
compensation where no employer-employee relationship
exists;" (d) and lastly, it may lack jurisdiction because of
failure to comply with the requirements imposed by law for
the exercise of its power," e.g., failure to follow proper procedure." It is therefore clear that the question of jurisdiction
and the question of regularity of procedure are often intertwined and that a clear-cut line of demarcation is difficult
to draw between the two. Indeed, most of the jurisdictions in
this country have come to the conclusion that both questions
are reviewable on certiorari.4' Thus, the tests laid down in
the Clark case were in line with the current of authority
throughout much of the country. They were, moreover, in
accord with the historical aims and purposes of certiorari as
'
Goodnow, supra note 1, at 518.
39 Restatement, Judgments §5 (1942).
40 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1944); Smith v. Smith, 7
N.D. 404, 74 N.W. 783 (1898).
Restatement, Judgments §6 (1942); Nelson v. Ecklund, 68 N.D. 724,
283 N.W. 273 (1938); Morrisey v. Blasky, 22 N.D. 430, 134 N.W.
319 (1912).
Restatement, Judgments §7 (1942).
i3 See Enderlin Bank v. Rose, 4 N.D. 319, 332, 58 N.W. 514, 519 (1894).
4
Uphoff v. Industrial Commission, 271 Ill. 312, 111 N.E. 128 (1916);
Borgnis v. Falk, 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911).
.5 Restatement, Judgments §8 (1942); 4 Miami L.Q. 367, 368 (1950).
4
State ex rel. Ness v. Fargo, 63 N.D. 33, 245 N.W. 887 (1932); State
ex rel. Clyde v. Lauder, 11 N.D. 136, 90 N.W. 564 (1901).
"
See the brief description of the law in a representative group of jurisdictions contained in. 11 C.J. 92-95.
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an extraordinary remedy." Defined as it was in State ex rel.
Johnson v. Clark, excess of jurisdiction was a broad and flexible concept. It consisted, to cite the language of a California
decision, of any acts, exceeding the defined power of any tribunal in any instance, "whether that power be defined by
constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or
rules developed by the court and followed under the doctrine
of stare decisis . . ."

This is not to say that the court meant that any unwise
or unfortunate decision by an official agency was to be correctible on certiorari; the Clark case clearly contemplated no
such result. What the decision appears to stand for is the proposition that the writ was to be used to see to it that legally
correct methods were used in the conduct of official business, and that palpable errors committed in the course of administering the laws might be corrected by the writ when no
other remedy was available.'
There is, however, a considerable difference between the
review of decisions of administrative agencies or municipal
governments, and the review of regular judicial or even quasijudicial proceedings. And following the Clark case, as a
series of administrative decisions was brought before it on
certiorari, the court began veering toward a far more restricted view of what constituted an excess of jurisdiction.
What influenced the court is not clear. It may have been
simply an unquestioning acceptance of the mistaken belief
that certiorari lay only to review questions of jurisdiction
combined with a lack of analysis concerning the nature of
jurisdictional error. It may have been the feeling of the
court that the administrative agencies of the government were
entitled to greater freedom of action. It may have been the
.
The scope of certiorari at the common law does not seem to have
been limited to a particular class of error; the errors which were correctible were those shown on the face of the record . . . But a jurisdictional
error could be shown by evidence outside the record. Thus summarizing
briefly: the available evidence indicates that at the common law certiorari
to quash could be used to quash any judgment based on errors of law
appearing on the record and errors of jurisdiction whether or not they
appeared on the record." Goldberg, supra note 1, at 562-63.
49 Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 291, 109 P.2d 942,
948 (1941). See also Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. 111, 119 (1860),
where it is said: "If certiorari will lie for want of jurisdiction in cases
where the common law remedy of certiorari, in its usual acceptation, is
expressly or confessedly taken away, it follows, as an unavoidable conclusion, that the usual office of the common law writ is to inquire into
something more than jurisdiction."
,0 This view is clearly supported by the statute, which provides that "the
review upon a writ of certiorari cannot be extended further than to
determine whether the inferior court, tribunal, board, or officer has
pursued regularly the authority of such court, tribunal, board, or officer."
N.D. Rev. Code §32-3309 (1943).
4s
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effect of precedents from other western jurisdictions, where
the idea that certiorari tests only jurisdiction has always been
popular. More probably, the change in the court's view was
caused by the stubborn continuance of the factor that State
ex rel. Johnson v. Clark attempted to eliminate from the law
of certiorari-the distinction between legislative and judicial
acts, which may be hazy at times but which nevertheless is
difficult if not impossible to disregard entirely. Regardless of
what it was, the court shortly thereafter began to take the
view that the type of jurisdictional error which was correctible on certiorari was error which prevented the administrative agency or municipal government from possessing jurisdiction over a case from its inception. The regularity of the
proceedings-particularly the extent to which the decision
was supported by the evidence-became less and less a factor.
The change appears to have begun with the case of Albrecht- v. Zimmerly,' which involved removal proceedings
against a county commissioner on the ground that he had accepted illegal fees while in office. The judge of the district
court orally requested a judge from another district to try
the case in his place. 'At a subsequent hearing, the petitioner
made a special appearance and objected to the jurisdiction
of the court on the ground that the file of the case contained
no written request from the regular judge that the substituted
judge sit in his place and that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action. Neither the regular nor the substituted
judge was present, but the clerk of court signed an order in
the name of the substituted judge overruling the objections
and reciting that since the petitioner had failed to demand a
jury trial, the issues would be tried by the court. At this
stage of the proceedings, the petitioner applied for a writ of
certiorari to the supreme court, 2 contending that an excess
of jurisdiction would occur if the case were brought on for
trial. The court met the argument that the action of the
clerk of court was invalid by sidestepping it. It pointed to
the action of the petitioner in objecting to the complaint on
the ground that it failed to state a cause of action and made
the obvious reply that the court had personal jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner because in substance he had
filed a demurrer. Since the court had personal jurisdiction,
it was argued, it became unnecessary to consider the validity
of the clerk's action. Thus, while the application for certior5'
52

23 N.D. 337, 136 N.W. 240 (1912).
It might be pointed out that the errors claimed might very easily have
been remedied on appeal. The argument made to the court was that the
relator would be deprived, of his office during the time of appeal should
the court decide against him. The court did not discuss the point at
length and does not appear to have considered it closely.
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ari was made in part at least on the theory that the orders
filed by the clerk of court were in excess of jurisdiction because procedurally irregular, the question of regularity was
not even considered reviewable on the writ. Yet it is indicative of the natural scope of certiorari in such a situation
that although, by the court's own view, it was unnecessary
to discuss the validity of the clerk's order, the court strongly
intimated that it felt the order was invalid and advised,
though it did not direct, that it be set aside.
From this case on, repeated instances have occurred
where relief from the effects of irregularity or error in the
course of official proceedings has been denied because jurisdiction in the sense of power to hear and determine the case
or to take the type of official action involved was present."
The most spectacular example of this development is Baker
v. Lenhart,"' which graphically illustrates the court's reversion from a broad to a narrow concept of excess of jurisdiction.
The facts involved were that the ^petitioner owned land at
the southwbst corner of the city of Bismarck. A statute provided that,\pon petition it was the duty of the city council
to exclude indeveloped territory from the city limits when
the land lay 'pon the borders of the municipality. In an attempt to obtain the exclusion of his territory the petitioner
presented a petition to the city council, which made a finding of fact that\the land was bordered upon three sides and
partly upon a fouoh by other territory within the city limits.
In fact this was a clear error or misstatement and the land
was suitable for exclusion. The petitioner sought a writ of
certiorari to have the action reviewed as an excess of jurisdiction, lost in the district court, and appealed.
On the first hearing of the case, the Supreme Court was
split. The majority held that the city council was acting
,3

The cases of State ex rel. Wehe v. Frazier, 47 N.D. 314, 182 N.W. 545
(1921) and State ex rel. Ness v. Fargo, 63 N.D. 85, 246 N.W. 243
(1932) must be classed as exceptions. In the first case cited, the order
of the governor in removing a Workmen's Compensation Commissioner
from office was set aside because of the governor's failure to swear in
witnesses against the commissioner before requiring him to testify. In
the second case the order of a city commission removing an assessor
from office was set aside because the city commission had not followed
judicial procedure in performing what the court considered a quasi'
judicial function. The authority of both cases, however, must be considered as severely limited by subsequent decisions, notably State ex tel.
Olson v. Welford, 65 N.D. 522, 260 N.W. 593 (1935), sustaining a
very liberal use of the governor's power of removal, and State ex tel.
Ness v. Fargo, 63 N.D. 85, 246 N.W. 243 (1932), the second appeal
in the assessor's case, which upheld the city commission on the narrowest
possible interpretation of the scope of certiorari.
50 N.D. 30. 195 N.W. 16 (1923).
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legislatively," and its action could not be set aside because it
was the agency vested with the authority to determine the
facts of the matter. The dissenting opinion made the obvious
point that it was error to permit the city council to hide behind a flat misstatement of fact and thus avoid a duty imposed upon it by statute, regardless of whether the city would
suffer loss in tax revenue by the exclusion of the land. Thus
ended the first round of the case. The next commenced on
rehearing, granted on the strength of the dissent and a change
in the membership of the court. The opinion on rehearing
and the further dissenting opinion provide the most exhaustive and carefully reasoned discussions of certiorari ever
written by the North Dakota court.
The majority, on rehearing, reaffirmed the decision arrived at in the original opinion. The conclusion was reached
by pointing to the fact that the petitioner had himself presented the application for exclusion to the city government,
thus conferring upon it power to decide the case. Since the
plaintiff had himself invoked the authority of the city commission, the reasoning went, "jurisdiction" in the city was
clearly established. At this point, it was the thesis of the
majority, inquiry into the merits of the case ceased. When
once the court was satisfied that the city commission was
competent to hear the issue, it was no longer concerned with
the manner in which the jurisdiction was exercised.'
The
court could not review the evidence. ' Cases cited to the contrary were distinguished on the ground that they involved
the exercise 'of the court's supervisory power over lower
courts in the judicial system, while this case was concerned
with a tribunal over which the supreme court possessed no
such inherent supervisory power.'
The dissent to the opinion on rehearing made abundantly
clear what is obvious on the face of the decision: the majority was deliberately giving a highly restricted application to
Contra, Mogaard v. Garrison,
(action held quasi-judicial).

47 N.D. 468,

182 N.W. 758

(1921)

The result was reached, it may be noted, in the teeth of decisions
pointing squarely at the doctrine of jurisdictional fact, several such cases
being cited and discussed at length.
But cf. Lowe v. District Court, 48 N.D. 1, 181 N.W. 92 (1921); Zinn
v. District Court, 17 N.D. 135, 114 N.W. 472 (1908); Murphy v.
District Court, 14 N.D. 542, 105 N.W. 728 (1905).
5s

See discussion, infra. Cf. State ex rel. Poole v. Nuchols, 18 N.D. 233,
119 N.W. 632 (1909).
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If the Clark case's
the concept of excess of jurisdiction."
test of excess of jurisdiction was not overruled specifically,
its authority was at least disregarded. Excess of jurisdiction,
in the majority's view, related to the competency of the
agency involved to decide the case; it had little connection
with the regularity of the proceedings once validly commenced."
While there have been occasional exceptions"5 the court
has adhered with considerable consistency to the doctrine of
Baker v. Lenhart in administrative law matters ever since.
Shortly afterward the court upheld a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board refusing increased compensation
to an injured claimant despite the fact that no evidence was
introduced to meet the expert medical testimony he had presented. " While the result was influenced by the fact that the
statutes provided no appeal from decisions of the Board on
questions of fact," and also by the element of expertness inherent in such a board, the justification for the decision was
In Coffound in a limited concept of excess of jurisdiction.'
man v. Ousterhous it was implicit in the decision that the
59 "The

majority opinion has given a very limited field of application to
the term 'excess of jurisdiction' . . . This court has held . . . that in
view of the express language of the statute, the supreme and district
courts have the power to examine the acts of such tribunals as are
exercising administrative, legislative, judicial and other functions for the
sole purpose of ascertaining whether they have proceeded according to
law." 50 N.D., at 64-65, 195 N.W. at 30. (Emphasis is that of the dissenting opinion).
d A companion case, Lincoln Addition Improvement Company v. Lenhart,
50 N.D. 25, 195 N.W. 14, 33 (1922), is interesting because of the
comment appearing in a concurring opinion. It was stated that excess of
jurisdiction must consist of something beside failure to act, and therefore the order of the city council refusing to take action could not be
considered an excess of jurisdiction. This has overtones of the "negative
order" doctrine rejected in Rochester Telephone Company v. United
States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
65
See note 53, supra.
State ex rel. Craig v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 53 N.D. 649,
207 N.W. 649 (1925).
Crandall v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 53 N.D.
636, 207 N.W. 551 (1926).
'4 "The fact of being the kind of employee subject to the act is jurisdictional;
the fact of duration of disability or amount of wage loss is not. As to
review of facts, denial of jurisdiction in the commission may be of one
of two kinds. (1) The claimant may deny the jurisdiction on the ground
that a certain jurisdictional fact has not been established, and that on
the failure of that one fact alone the commission is deprived of jurisdiction. (2) The claimant may show that the commission's findings on certain
non-jurisdictional facts are altogether unsupported by evidence. This in
itself is action in excess of jurisdiction, as well as an error of law."
Larson, The Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact," 15 Temp.L.Q. 185, 204
(1941).
40 N.D. 390. 168 N.W. 826 (1918).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

same limited view was being applied. The court refused to
set aside an administrative decision affirming an ex parte
preliminary order revoking the petitioner's license to operate
a dairy, because even though the decision and hearing were
rendered by the wrong official-the Secretary of Agriculture and Labor rather than the Dairy Commissioner-the
petitioner had himself invoked the Secretary's authority. In
Livingston v. Peterson' the court refused to set aside the order
of a city commission refusing to grant a variance in a zoning
ordinance, stating that the sole question for the court was
whether the city had jurisdiction to act in the matter and
quoting Baker v. Lenhart to the effect that "no matter how
erroneous the decision may be, even on the face of the record,
the reviewing court has no power to change, annul or reverse
it in a proceeding on certiorari."' In State ex rel. Olson v. Welford' the determination of the governor in removing a state
highway commissioner from office was upheld on extremely
sparse evidence, the court stating: "It is not for this court
to say that the evidence is trivial, that it does not support
the charge . . . The determination 'whether based on sufficient
evidence or not, is a determination arrived at in the exercise
of . . . jurisdiction, and however erroneous it may be, it is
not void for want of power in the court to render the decision.'
The restricted concept of excess of jurisdiction employed
in these cases has been particularly evident in the cases involving municipalities, where a series of cases has upheld the
idea that it is only the competency of the city to conduct the
inquiry, rather than the manner in which the inquiry proceeds or the result which it reaches, which is reviewable on
certiorari.0 The latest case on the subject is State ex rel.
Dreyer v. Brekke,-" which is notable both for its clear grasp
of the importance of the question of what constitutes an excess of jurisdiction and because it represents the most recent
consideration of the question by the court. The case involved
the validity of an ordinance adopted by the city of Minot
authorizing the use of parking meters-manifestly a situation where the exercise of legislative powers by a municipality is involved. The majority opinion, upholding the ordin01

59 N.D. 104, 228 N.W. 816 (1930).
Id. at 109, 228 N.W. at 818.
65 N.D. 522, 260 N.W. 593 (1935).
Id. at 542-43, 260 N.W. at 602.
.0 State ex. rel.Dreyer v. Brekke, 75 N.D. 468, 28 N.W. 2d 598 (1947):
Bryant v. Olson, 68 N.D. 605, 282 N.W. 405 (1938); State ex rel. Ness
v. Fargo, 63 N.D. 85, 246 N.W. 243 (1932); Livingston v. Peterson,
59 N.D. 104, 228 N.W. 816 (1930); State ex Tel. Claver v. Broute, 50
N.D. 753, 197 N.W. 871 (1921).
75 N.D. 468, 28 N.W.2d 598 (1947).
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ance against attack by certiorari, said, after a scholarly
review of the cases: "Summed up, we think that jurisdiction
within the meaning of that term as used in the statute . . .
may be defined as the power and authority to act with respect to any particular subject matter . . . Accordingly . . . if
the commission was empowered to regulate the use of the
streets of the city to which the ordinance had application,
then it had jurisdiction to enact such a regulatory ordinance
as in its judgment seemed proper and efficacious to attain
that end, and mere error of judgment in thus exercising its
And in
power would not constitute excess of jurisdiction."
a concurring opinion, the rule which has been followed since
Baker v. Lenhart was stated even more accurately: "Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine and does not depend upon regularity of its exercise nor upon correctness of
decision . . ."' (Emphasis supplied). This must be accepted
as an accurate statement of the function and limitations of
the writ of certiorari as it is applied today in North Dakota
to the actions of administrative agencies.
It should be clear from what has been said that the term
"excess of jurisdiction" has varied remarkably in content and
meaning during the course of decisions adopted in certiorari
cases in this state. Generalizations about such a concept are
tricky and difficult; it has been stated that the term "excess
of jurisdiction" is "difficult, if not impossible," to define."'
The task of making a comprehensive statement of the meaning of the term is therefore one which is not to be approached
in a spirit of dogmatic certainty. Yet over the course of the
decisions, it has been the Baker v. Lenhart doctrine which has
been controlling, and it therefore appears possible to summarize by saying that after the early broad concept of excess of jurisdiction employed in State ex rel. Johnson v.
Clark, the court has limited the meaning of excess of jurisdiction primarily to situations where the action of the agency
or official under review was one which the agency or official
was not empowered to take either because (a) no notice and
hearing had been given to the party affected," or (b) the
72

Id.

at 471-72, 28 N.W.2d at 600.

Id. at 483, 28 N.W.2d at 604.
T
11 C.J., Certiorari, 103. Similar statements are made in State ex rel.
Dreyer v. Brekke, supra. See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in City of Yonkers v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 320
U.S. 685 (1944): "Analysis is not furthered by speaking of such find,
ings as jurisdictional, and not even when-to adapt a famous phrasejurisdictional is softened by a quasi. 'Jurisdiction' competes with 'right'
as one of the most deceptive of legal pitfalls."
7 Nelson v. Ecklund, 68 N.D. 724, 283 N.W. 273 (1938); Morrissey v.
Blasky,'22 N.D. 430, 134 N.W.1 319 (1912). Cf. State ex rel. Clyde v.
Lauder, 11 N.D. 136, 90 N.W. 564 (1901); Enderlin Bank v. Rose, 4
N.D. 319, 58 N.W. 514 (1894).
"3
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agency or official was not competent to try the issue."' With
rare exceptions the court has refused, while hearing cases in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, to reverse or set aside
an official order or judgment because of procedural irregularities occuring during the course of the proceedings or because
error or mistake took place." The court has applied excess
of jurisdiction in such a way as to make it mean a failure of
inceptive jurisdiction, nothing more."
V. Extraordinary Jurisdiction and Certiorari
To the general rule that it is only acts in excess of jurisdiction which are reviewable on certiorari, at least one clearcut exception has developed, however. While the statutes
prescribe excess of jurisdiction as the sole ground for the issuance of the writ, the Constitution of the State of North Dakota also provides that the Supreme Court may issue writs
of certiorari and other prerogative writs when necessary to
9
But the Supreme
the proper exercise of its jurisdiction."
Court has several different jurisdictions, derived from its
position as the successor in the State of North Dakota to the
Briefly, it possjurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench.
esses appellate, original, and superintending jurisdiction."
State ex rel. Dreyer v. Brekke, 75 N.W. 468, 28 N.W.2d 598 (1947);
Bryan v. Olson, 68 N.D. 605, 282 N.W. 405 (1938); State ex rel. Olson
v. Welford, 65 N.D. 522, 260 N.W. 593 (1935); State ex rel. Ness v.
Fargo, 63 N.D. 85, 246 N.W. 243 (1932); State ex rel. Craig v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 53 N.D. 649, 207 N.W. 649 (1925); State
ex rel. Claver v. Broute, 50 N.D. 753, 197 N.W. 871 (1923); Baker
v. Lenhart, 50 N.D. 30, 195 N.W. 16 (1923); Lincoln Addition Im,
provement Company v. Lenhart, 50 N.D. 25, 195 N.W. 14, 33 (1922);
Cofman v. Ousterhous, 40 N.D. 390, 168 N.W. 826 (1918); State ex
rel. Poole v. Peake, 22 N.D. 457, 135 N.W. 197 (1912).
77
See Peterson v. Points, 67 N.D. 631, 275 N.W. 867 (1937), for one
of the exceptions. The* court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence
in a certiorari proceeding brought to test the validity of an order granting
relief from a mortgage under moratorium legislation, pointing out that
the legislature had provided for review of such proceedings on certiorari,
thus indicating a desire for a broadened review of these proceedings by
the writ. But cf. Livingston v. Peterson, 59 N.D. 104, 228 N.W. 816
(1930).
s This is particularly true in the cases where the applicant for certiorari
In such
has himself invoked the jurisdiction of the agency involved.
cases the doctrine of Baker v." Lenhart has been applied full force. Bishop
v. Depositor's Guaranty Fund Commission, 55 N.D. 178, 212 N.W. 828
(1927). What this means in substance is that he who seeks relief from
an administrative agency, by invoking the jurisdiction of the agency,
waives all errors.
N.D. Const. §87.
so See the discussion of these various jurisdictions contained in Newton,
Appellate Practice and Procedure in North Dakota, 27 N.D.L.Rev. 155,
156,60 (1951).
N.D.Const. §§86, 87; State ex rel. Conrad v. Langer, 68 N.D. 167, 277
N.W. 504 (1938); State ex rel. Jacobson v. District Court, 68 N.D. 211,
277 N.W. 843 (1938); Baker v. Lenhart, 50 N.D. 30, 195 N.W. 16
(1923).

,
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And the uses to which the writ of certiorari may be put, as
well as the extent of the review which it will permit, vary
as the writ is used in the exercise of these different jurisdictions.
In the "ordinary" certiorari case coming before the court
-where an administrative agency or municipality has taken
action, a district court has agreed or refused to quash the
action on certiorari, and the matter is taken up to the Supreme
Court on appeal-it is the Supreme Court's power to hear
and finally decide cases on appeal, the appellate jurisdiction,"
which is exercised. And in such cases the scope of the review
has been rigidly restricted by virtue of the limited concept
of excess of jurisdiction developed by the court for the simple
reason that the Supreme Court's power of superintending
control does not reach to agencies not a part of the judicial
system."
But where it is the action of the lower court itself, not
the action of an administrative agency, which is under scrutiny, the court is not restricted to the hearing of the case as
a matter of appellate jurisdiction. By virtue of its superintending jurisdiction it possesses the inherent power to supervise and direct the work of the lower courts." Nor is it
restricted to situations where the lower court is acting in excess of jurisdiction, but may exercise its supervisory authority even though the lower court has kept within the bonds
of its legal powers."
When, therefore, the writ is used for the purpose of making this superintending control effective, the precedents make
it plain that the writ is issued not by virtue of the prescription
of the statute but by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution itself.' And it follows from this that when certiorari is
used in the exercise of superintending jurisdiction it reaches
questions beyond that of whether the lower court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The statutory restrictions
do not apply. 7
82
83
84

"

State exrel. Lemke v. District Court, 49 N.D. 27, 186 N.W. 381 (1921).
See also Newton, supra note 80, at 156.
State ex rel. Poole v. Nuchols, 18 N.D. 233, 119 N.W. 632 (1909).
State ex rel. Lemke v. District Court, 49 N.D. 27, 186 N.W. 381 (1921);
State ex rel. Moore v. Archibald, 5 N.D. 359, 66 N.W. 234 (1902).
State ex rel. Shafer v. District Court, 49 N.D. 1127, 194 N.W. 745
(1923); State ex rel. Jacobson v. District Court, 68 N.D. 211, 277 N.W.
843 (1938).
Baker v. Lenhart, 50 N.D. 30, 50 et seq., 195 N.W. 16j' 23-24 (1923);
State ex rel. Lemke v. District Court, 49 N.D. 27, 186 N.W. 381

(1921).

ST See cases cited note 86, supra.
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Illustrative of the use of certiorari for supervisory purposes are a series of change of venue cases decided by the
court. The earliest of these is Murphy v. District Court,' involving a change of venue application in a criminal proceeding which had become enmeshed in political difficulties. The
petitioner, defendant in the criminal proceeding, sought a
review of the order of the lower court sending the case to a
county in the far eastern part of the state for trial, contending that the added expense and difficulty involved were such
that the trial judge abused his discretion in the selection.
The court proceeded to review the facts and evidence at
length, and eventually concluded otherwise. Although the
court stated that the question was "whether the ... presiding
judge exceeded his jurisdiction in sending the case to Cass
county," the major premise implicit in the decision is obvious: if an abuse of discretion appeared, the Supreme
Court had power to correct it by use of certiorari. For purposes of supervisory jurisdiction over an inferior court, in
other words, an abuse of discretion was regarded as "jurisdictional."
The conflict between this concept of jurisdictional error
and the limited concept of jurisdictional error employed in
the appellate jurisdiction cases quickly caused the court to
entertain some doubts as to the wisdom of its decision. It
later took pains to point out that some of its members were
by no means approving of the doctrine that a writ of certiorari
was the appropriate remedy."
Subsequent cases, however,
exhibit traces of no such qualms, clearly recognizing the
distinction between certiorari when used in aid of supervisory
and appellate jurisdiction," and the court's lengthy and considered discussion in Baker v. Lenhart wrote it firmly into
the case law. So clearly has the distinction been drawn that
the cases hold that certiorari will lie when the order is
appealable, as is the case where an order granting a change
s
90

14 N.D. 542, 105 N.W. 728 (1905).
See Zinn v. Morton County, 17 N.D. 135, 140, 114 N.W. 472, 475
(1908).
State ex rel. Lemke v. District Court, 49 N.D. 27, 186 N.W. 381 (1921);
Lowe v. District Court, 48 N.D. 1, 181 N.W. 92 (1921); State ex rel.
Red River Brick Corp. v. District Court, 24 N.D. 28, 138 N.W. 988
(1912).
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of venue is concerned,' and the Lenhart case recognized as
2
much."
One extremely interesting consequence of this line of
reasoning occurred in a case involving an application for a
change of venue which the state itself had made in a criminal
action. Obviously, the order of the trial court refusing the
change could not be appealed after the verdict because the
defendant would be in a position to plead double jeopardy.
The remedy sought was an application for a writ of certiorari
by the prosecution, which attempted to invoke the Supreme
Court's supervisory power over the lower court. While relief was refused, the court considered the application on its
merits and concluded that on the facts no abuse of discretion
appeared. 3 The possibilities are obvious.
However, the court has made it plain that the supervisory
jurisdiction may not be invoked in the routine case. The
power of supervision and control is pre-eminently discretionary with the court, and circumstances of special hardship and
injustice, sufficient to create a threat to the proper administration of some judicial proceeding, must be present." The
superintending power is used primarily in situations where a
court is acting in abuse of its discretion or outside its discretionary power, or when the courts are proceeding within
their jurisdiction "but by mistake of law, or willful disregard
of it, are doing a gross injustice."" A factor to be considered seriously is the appealability of the action taken by
the court or the existence of some adequate remedy," but the
im Robertson Lumber Co. v. Jones, 13 N.D. 112, 99 N.W. 1082 (1904).
But see Squire v. County Court, 25 N.D. 468, 141 N.W. 1135 (1913).
92
"In the exercise of its superintending jurisdiction the court not only
may issue all common law writs applicable to superintending control
over inferior courts, but, if the exigencies of the case so require it may
modify or enlarge the terms of such writs. . . . Where certiorari is
invoked in aid of the superifitending jurisdiction, if the exigencies of the
case require, the writ may issue and appropriate action taken even
though the action which it is sought to have corrected is in fact appealable." Baker v. Lenhart, 50 N.D. 30, 49-50, 195 N.W. 16, 23,24 (1923).
92
State v. Winchester, 19 N.D. 756, 122 N.W. 1111 (1909). Accord,
State ex rel. Fletcher v. District Court, 213 Iowa 822, 238 N.W. 290
(1931); Note, 18 Iowa L.Rev. 263 (1933) (discussing certiorari as a
method of reviewing judicial discretion in Iowa).
"
State ex rel. Jacobson v. District Court, 68 N.D. 211, 277 N.W. 843
(1938); State ex rel. Lemke v. District Court, 49 N.D. 27, 186 N.W.
381 (1921); Red River Valley Brick Co. v. Grand Forks, 27 N.D. 8,
145 N.W. 725 (1914).
State ex rel. Lemke v. District Court, 49 N.D. 27, 42, 186 N.W. 381,
387 (1921).
Schouweiler v. Allen, 17 N.D. 510, 117 N.W. 866 (1908) (use of
superintending jurisdiction denied because erroneous order might be
corrected on appeal); State ex rel. Clyde v. Lauder, 11 N.D. 136, 90
N.W. 564 (1901) (erroneous order reviewed by certiorari because not
appealable); Enderlin Bank v. Rose, 4 N.D. 319, 58 N.W. 514 (1894)
(collateral remedy inadequate, hence relief by certiorari granted).
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fact that a remedy by appeal or collateral suit exists is not
conclusive against the exercise of the Supreme Court's
power."
An attitude of unfairness, prejudice or bias on the
part of the trial judge would appear entitled, for historical
reasons, to particular weight with the Supreme Court, since
"the main office of a certiorari" is "the keeping of unfair
magistrates within the compass of their power."" Yet the
fact that the supervisory jurisdiction is discretionary remains
the important point, and the court has recognized that its
main business is the hearing and deciding of appeals and that
the supervisory jurisdiction should be limited to situations
of emergency or exigency.'
To lay down any mechanical
rule concerning the situations under which the court will
exercise this authority, therefore, may well be to mislead.
The matter appears to be one of degree and sound judgment.
*There remains for consideration the third of the supreme
court's trilogy of jurisdictions, original jurisdiction. By all
odds, the leading as well as the earliest case on the exercise
of original jurisdiction is State v. Nelson County,
decided
only a few years after statehood was attained. The rule laid
down in that case is simple, plain and concise: the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, just as the original jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench, will be exercised only
in cases which are publici juris-i.e., affect the "sovereignty
of the state, its franchises and prerogatives, or the liberties
of its people.''
In order to warrant the exercise of original
jurisdiction, the case must be one of more than private importance, affecting the interests of the state or its people as
a whole, e.g., the question of whether the governor has been
disqualified from holding his office,' whether an incumbent
state official defeated in an election can contest the qualifications of his successor,' whether the governor's power of
removal has been validly exercised,' whether the Superintendent of the State Hospital for the Insane may be removed
by the board of trustees before his term expires,9" whether a
statewide tax levy exceeds constitutional limits, whether an
07 See

notes 91 and 92, supra.
Enderlin Bank v. Rose, 4 N.D. 319, 332, 58 N.W. 514, 519 (1894).
99
State ex rel.
Red River Brick Corporation v. District Court, 24 N.D. 28,
138 N.W. 988 (1912).
"0
1 N.D. 88, 45 N.W. 33 (1890).
201 Id. at 101, 45 N.W.at 38.
"
State ex rel.Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 256 N.W. 377 (1934).
State ex rel.Langer v. McDonald, 41 N.D. 389, 170 N.W. 873 (1919).
'0 State ex rel.Olson v. Welford, 65 N.D. 522, 260 N.W. 593 (1935);
State ex rel. Wehe v. Frazier, 47 N.D. 314, 182 N.W. 545 (1921).
'9
State e&. rel.
Moore v. Archibald, 5 N.D. 359, 66 N.W. 234 (1902).
Us
State ex rel.Conrad v. Langer, 68 N.D. 167, 277 N.W. 504 (1938);
But cf. Duluth Elevator Co. v. White, 11 N.D. 534, 90 N.W. 12 (1902).
98
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act establishing a statewide board has been subjected to popular referendum,"° ' whether the legislature has appropriated
money to pay the salaries of the state tax commission,,'
whether the governor has the power to appoint a district
judge,' and whether an act establishing a state bonding fund
for municipal and county officers is constitutional.' °
Conversely, the court has held that such questions as
whether a tax levied by a county for the relief of needy
farmers is valid,"' whether valid proceedings have been taken
to subdivide one county into two,"' whether a county seat
should be moved from one town to another,' and whether
an assessment increasing the tax levy upon grain elevators
and warehouses throughout the state is legal ' are not appropriate for the exercise of original jurisdiction but should be
tried in the district courts, on the ground that they do not
represent issues of public, as distinguished from private or
local importance.
The controlling factor has been the importance of the question to the state as a whole, a matter
which cannot be determined except in the context of particular cases, and for that reason generalizations are of little
value. It is clear that the position taken by the attorney
general with respect to a given case will be of the utmost
weight, since in original jurisdiction cases the state is always
the plaintiff and the attorney general represents the state."'
But while this is an important consideration and application
should ordinarily be made to the attorney general for action
before an exercise of original jurisdiction is sought, refusal
of the attorney general to act does not prevent the court
from hearing the case as an original matter.'
The concept of excess of jurisdiction which has been applied by the court in the original jurisdiction cases has been
closely akin to that used in the cases involving administrative
action, rather than the broader view which has been taken
in the supervisory jurisdiction cases."
It seems an unsettled
question whether the Supreme Court is absolutely bound to
Stato-ex rel. Baker v. Hanna, 31 N.D. 570, 154 N.W. 704 (1915).
State ex rel. Birdzell v. Jorgenson, 25 N.D. 539, 142 N.W. 450 (1913).
State ex rel. Erickson v. Burr, 16 N.D. 581, 113 N.W. 705 (1907).
State ex, rel. Linde v. Taylor, 33 N.D. 76, 156 N.W. 561 (1916).
"'
North Dakota v. Nelson County, 1 N.D. 88, 45 N.W. 33 (1890).
M State ex rel. Minehan v. Wing, 18 N.D. 242, 119 N.W. 944 (1909).
See State ex rel. Steel v. Fabrick, 17 N.D. 532, 537, 117 N.W. 860,
862 (1908).
"
State ex rel. Murphy v. Gottbreht, 17 N.D. 543, 117 N.W. 864 (1908).
'
Duluth Elevator Co. v. White, 11 N.D.' 534, 90 N.W. 12 (1902).
'
State ex rel. Conrad v. Langer, 68 N.D. 167, 277 N.W. 504 (1938);
State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 410, 160 N.W. 512 (1916).
"'
State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, supra note 115.
State ex rel. Olson v. Welford, 65 N.D. 522, 260 N.W. 593 (1935).
"
"'
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those limitations, however. As in the case of superintending
jurisdiction, the court appears to use prerogative writs in the
original jurisdiction cases not by virtue of the statute but by
virtue of the provisions of the Constitution; and if one accepts
the argument in the supervisory writ cases at face value, the
logical conclusion would seem to be that certiorari might be
used in its common law scope rather than hindered by the restrictions of the statute, should the court wish to do so. The
point has never been expressly decided, since it seems to have
been assumed by all parties in the cases where original jurisdiction was exercised on certiorari that the court was bound
by the terms of the statute, and there has therefore never been
occasion for the court to decide otherwise.
VI.

Appealability; Adequate Remedy

Since certiorari is classified as an extraordinary remedy,
it will not be granted in the ordinary case where an appeal
will serve to present an error to the higher court or where
some other remedy is present. In the case of administrative
agencies and municipalities, appealability presents few problems beyond those connected with the finality of administrative action. and the proper timing of the request for judicial
relief,' since the matter of whether an appeal will lie from
the determinations of these bodies is ordinarily regulated
specifically by statute.
While North Dakota was among the first states to enact
a statute providing a uniform course of procedure for administrative agencies,' it is to be noted that the Administrative
Agencies Uniform Practice Act does not "itself grant a right
of review but merely sets up a code of procedure for those
cases in which review is granted by some other statute."'
Hence, while procedure on appeal from an administrative
agency is regulated by the Uniform Practice Act, the appeal
must be granted by some provision of law outside of the Act
The result is that the Act will undoubtedly have
itself.'
small effect on the future availability of certiorari, although
its effect on the future scope and extent of the review granted
by the writ is distinctly another question, discussed infra.

20

While of technical interest, such problems are not discussed in this paper
since cases involving certiorari have not turned upon them in this state.
See the Administrative Agencies Uniform Practice Act, N.D. Rev. Code
c. 28-32 (1943); Hoyt, North Dakota Leads in Administrative Law
Field, 25 J.Am.Jud.Soc. 114 (1941).
Hoyt, supra note 119, at 115; 27 N.D.L.Rev. 218, 219 (1951).
For discussion of the effect of the act on administrative appeals, see
Comment, 24 N.D. Bar Briefs 211 (1948).
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It follows that the question of appealability ordinarily
arises in the cases where it is an order of an inferior courtnot an administrative agency-which is under review by
certiorari. The question of appealability with respect to the
orders which a court may issue turns on the interpretation
of statutes specifically regulating the subject' and little discussion of the case law which has developed need be
attempted here since in the great majority of cases in court
the remedy by appeal is adequate and obviates the necessity
for the use of an extraordinary remedy."' It may be observed,
however, that the fact that a right of appeal at one time
existed and was lost without fault of the party affected does
not mean that the remedy of certiorari is unavailable." Likewise, it has been noted that there have been instances where
the court in the exercise of its superintending jurisdiction
has intervened by certiorari, as in the change of venue cases.'"
One point which has appeared from time to time in the
cases concerns the question of whether an appeal may be
taken from a judgment which is absolutely void as in excess
of the court's jurisdiction. Since such a judgment may be set
aside by a collateral attack, or its execution may be enjoined
at the option of anyone whose rights it purports to affect, the
superficially logical argument has been made that no appeal
should lie from a judgment of this type and that the-remedy
sought should be a motion to vacate or to set aside the judgment in the lower court. There is actually some conflict of
authority on the point in other states,' but the North Dakota
Court has taken what seems the far more logical view, holding
that either the remedy of a motion to vacate or an appeal is
available to the person against whom such a judgment has
been rendered, and it follows that there is no necessity to
review such a judgment on certiorari." T
The existence of some other adequate remedy, of course,
in the ordinary course of events will preclude resort to an
extraordinary remedy. There are, however, a few cases which
develop interesting aspects of this portion of the law. The
earliest of these is Enderlin Bank v. Rose,' involving a conflict between an assignee for the benefit of creditors and a
"'

"

"7

N.D. Rev. Code §28-2702 (1943).
Viesselman, Dakota Practice 322-51 (1930). See also the discussion
appearing in Newton, Appellate Practice and Procedure in North Dakota,
27 N.D.L.Rev. 155, 160-64 (1951).
Morrissey v. Blasky, 22 N.D. 430, 134 N.W. 319 (1912).
See text, notes 90-92.
4 C.J.S. 205.
Sell v. Davis, 61 N.D. 130, 237 N.W. 307 (1931). Cf. McLean v
McLean, 69 N.D. 406, 287 N.W. 495 (1939).
4 N.D. 319, 58 N.W. 514 (1894).
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non-assenting creditor who in the course of an action against
the debtor had the assigned property attached. The assignee
thereupon applied to the district judge for the return of the
property and the judge issued an ex ,parteorder granting the
application. On petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court
it was argued that the creditor had an adequate remedy at
law, since he could bring suit for the value of the property
against the sheriff, who could not justify his action on the
basis of the court's order if it were void. It was held that the
writ would be issued, since the remedy by collateral suit was
neither certain nor speedy, there being uncertainity as to
whether the petitioner could collect from the sheriff or his
bondsmen, and the law's delays being proverbial. Moreover,
the court held, the remedy of the collateral suit did not grant
relief as to the precise subject matter of the order. The right
which was being asserted on certiorari was the right to direct
relief from an invalid order, not a right to collateral relief
from it.
Following the same line of thought, the court granted relief
on certiorari a few years, later to a state's attorney who had
come to the conclusion that a pending criminal action should
not be prosecuted, and whose salary a district judge had as a
result ordered withheld. The argument adopted by the court
was that the remedy of a suit against the county auditor was
not as efficient as the remedy by writ of certiorari, and
Enderlin Bank v. Rose was cited in support of the decision."
How far these precedents are applicable to ordinary litigation
is questionable, since both cases appear to be instances of the
exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.
VII.

Summary and Discussion
From the discussion thus far, it should be plain that the
employment of the writ of certiorari by the practitioner involves problems of great complexity and intricacy. The truth
of the matter seems to be that there is not one writ of certiorari in this state but two-the statutory writ, rigidly restricted in its concept of excess of jurisdiction, and the constitutional writ, which reaches mistakes of discretion, errors of law,
and the regularity of proceedings with comparative ease.
It is this factor which accounts for much of the inconsistency in the cases. It operates to transform the seemingly
plain and simple statutory requirements surrounding certiorari-that there be an official act in excess of jurisdiction and
a lack of appeal or other adequate remedy-into a maze in
which the unwary may easily be trapped and the careful attorney must grope his way by "feel" as well as by reliance
=9
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on cases or rules. The question is whether this development
is wise or necessary. Consider for a moment the statutory
language which surrounds the employment of the writ.
In the first place, as has been noted, the Code specifically
provides that proof aliunde the record may be brought in
wherever it is necessary.' It is manifest that such provisions
indicate a disposition on the part of the framers of the code
to broaden and enlarge the scope of the writ of certiorari to
a point where at least some portion of the record need not
be accepted as conclusive. If this portion of the law alone
were given the force and vitality which its framers obviously
intended it to have, cases such as Baker v. Lenhart might
easily be resolved by the simple medium of going behind the
record in situations where it appears to be justified.
Secondly, not content with laying down the three-fold
requirement of excess of jurisdiction, lack of appeal, and
lack of other adequate remedy, the code provides specifically
that "Except as otherwise provided by law, the review upon
a writ of certiorari cannot be extended further than to determine whether the inferior court, tribunal, board or officer has
pursued regularly the authority of such court, tribunal,
board or officer."'
The language of this statute may be
poorly chosen-it is framed in terms of a restriction upon the
scope of review rather than in terms of a direction as to
what the review shall consist of-but it is manifest that there
is implied within this section a clear authority to review not
only the question of whether the agency or tribunal whose
action is under scrutiny by certiorari had authority to hear
the issue and enter a decision, but whether the agency or tribunal proceeded in a lawful manner to a just result. It is
not just jurisdiction to hear and decide which is reviewable on
certiorari, if one reads the plain language of the statute. It
is the regularity and probity of the proceedings.
Thirdly, even if the foregoing were not enough to decide
the issue, the legislature has spoken out specifically on the
question of what the review by means of certiorari is to
involve. As early as 1919, apparently concerned by the drift
toward a restrictive use of certiorari, the legislature adopted
an amendment to the statute regulating the issuance of certiorari which provided specifically that a "writ of certiorari
may be granted . . . when, in the judgment of the court it
is deemed necessary to prevent miscarriage of justice."'
(Emphasis supplied).
The history of this amendment'
1
"'
' '

See notes 19-21, supra.
N.D. Rev. Code 032-3309 (1943).
N.D. Sess. Laws 1919, c. 76.
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presents a chapter remarkable even in the history of this
most unusual of writs. The result of this sweeping amendment, which at first glance would seem to transform certiorari
into a method of getting a hearing in almost every case where
inequity was claimed, has been, to this day, precisely nil! In
no case dealing with the writ of certiorari has the amendment played even the slightest part in the decision, though
it has several times been presented in argument, apparently
as a last resort. The court has contented itself with a simple
statement that the amendment does not extend the scope of
the writ.'
. Reasons for this result, apparently completely inconsistent with common sense, are easy to suggest. As in the case
of the section dealing with regularity of proceedings, the
language is poorly chosen. It amounts to a vague admonition to do justice without specifying what justice is to consist
of in any particular case. It is the expression, read literally,
of a pious wish. It is so vague that it is of no help when
placed in the context of a particular fact situation. Yet may
it not be suggested that it is the purpose behind the statute,
and not the choice of language, which is important? It remains the letter which killeth and the spirit which giveth
life. And the amendment appears to be an open expression
of the legislature's opinion that more satisfactory results
might be obtained in certiorari cases if the court were given
a broader avenue of approach. In view of the language of
the statute, there is clearly nothing inappropriate about an
increased review of the exercise of official discretion or the
regularity of official proceedings, at least to the point where
it is clear that the official discretion has been exercised in
a reasonable and orderly manner and that the proceedings
have conformed substantially to the requirements of the law.
It would seem particularly true that these sections of
the statute could appropriately be given full play in the
case of administrative action of the type involved in Baker
v. Lenhart. There are sound reasons for granting a maximum
of freedom of action and discretion to administrative bodies
and municipalities, particularly when they are acting in the
exercise of legislative rather than judicial powers. Yet it
must strike one as disconcerting, to say the least, to have it
solemnly adjudged the law that an administrative agency or
city council may, in the words of the dissent in that case,
conclude that "black is white and that two and two make
in

See, e.g., Sell v. Davis, 61 N.D. 130, 237 N.W. 307 (1931); Livingston
v. Peterson, 59 N.D. 104, 228 N.W. 816 (1930); Baker v. Lenhart, 50
N.D. 30, 195 N.W. 16 (1923); State ex rel. Mayo v. Thursby-Butte
School District, 45 N.D. 555, 178 N.W. 787 (1920).
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five and not four" and that the "courts are powerless to
grant a suitor any relief."" Yet it is to that position that the
logic of the present concept, of excess of jurisdiction leads.
It may be suggested that an appropriate method of meeting the situation where the, findings of fact are. clearly
erroneous is simply to apply the rule that the making of
a finding which is unsupported by substantial evidence is
procedurally irregular and that official action taken on the
strength of such proceedings will be set aside. This is the
solution which has been developed by the court in construing
the provisions of the Administrative Agencies Uniform Practice Act.'
The concept of substantial evidence is one which
ha§ already found its way into the law of the state, it offers
a means of extending the scope of the writ of certiorari in
accordance with the spirit and tenor of the various amendments which the legislature has made to the statutes, it is
well established as a basic part of the general law of administrative agencies, and it possesses the additional advantage
of being easier to apply and simpler to understand than the
limited concept of excess of jurisdiction which is now in use.
One possible objection which may be made to such a
suggestion is that it extends the idea of excess of jurisdiction
to the point where it might cover errors which would not be
held "jurisdictional" or sufficient to invalidate the proceedings
reviewed on collateral attack. So it would, but a simple
reference to the authorities is sufficient to show that such an
objection is entitled to little weight:
"It should be made clear that the word jurisdiction has been used in a special sense in regard to the
extraordinary writs. It certainly is not confined to
jurisdiction in the fundamental sense, i.e., that jurisdiction which a court must have in order to come
within the limits prescribed by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor is it confined
to jurisdiction in the sense of 'competency,' i.e., the
situation where the state has jurisdiction, but has by
statute or constitution provided that such jurisdiction
shall be exercised only by certain courts. If jurisdiction in either of the above senses is lacking, a judgment is void and, generally, open to collateral attack.
Lack of jurisdiction in the sense in which it is used
in the extraordinary writ cases, however, is not
necessarily a ground for collateral attack. As used
=4
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in the extraordinary writ cases lack of jurisdiction
means lack of authority to act except in a particular
manner or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act
without the concurrence of certain procedural requisites .....
It is submitted that much of the law of certiorari, therefore, could be simplified and improved if three basic ideas
were accepted:
(1) The writ of certiorari should be extended to include
a review of the regularity Of the proceedings as well as the
question of whether a given tribunal or officer is competent
to hear and decide the case.
(2) The review into the regularity of the proceedings
should include an inquiry into the evidence sufficient to make
it clear that substantial evidence exists to support any finding of fact made in the case or proceeding. It should be borne
in mind, however, that it is impractical and unwise to require
of administrative agencies the same scrupulous regard for
the law of evidence as regular judicial tribunals. The test
ought to be whether the same case or proceeding would be
upheld if it came to the court under the provisions of the
Administrative Agencies Uniform Practice Act.
(3) If the tribunal has within its control the parties,
property or status sought to be affected, employs reasonable
methods of giving notice and hearing and has actually
given them, is competent to hear and decide the case or issue
presented, and has proceeded to exercise its authority in a
lawful and regular manner, making findings of fact supported
by substantial evidence, its decision should not be disturbed
in order to give a maximum of freedom and flexibility of
action to administrative agencies, executive officials, and
municipal authorities.
Such an alteration in the law of certiorari, it is believed,
would transform what has become a confusing and antiquated
portion of the law into a smoothly operating device for the
review of administrative action, which is the main function
of certiorari today. Moreover, it would have the additional
effect of bringing certiorari into line with the concept of the
writ possessed by the men who drafted the code, as the
statutes cited clearly indicate. Some eighty-three years ago,
considering the identical problem, Judge Woodruff of the
New York Court of Appeals said:
=
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"I cannot resist the belief that a disposition has
been manifested to limit the office of this most useful
writ within too narrow limits. Let it once be established that where an officer or board of officers have
jurisdiction of the subject or of the persons to be
affected and proceed in its, exercise according to the
prescribed mode or forms, their determination is final
and beyond the reach of any review, whatever errors
in law they may commit and however clear it may
be upon undisputed facts that their judgment, decision or order is not warranted-and there is danger
that much injustice and wrong may happen without
possibility of redress . . . It may not be desirable to
multiply cases in which appellate courts can be called
upon to interfere in matters of small importance, but
that furnishes no reason for denying the power to see
that the rules of law are not violated, when wrong is
done, and no great public inconvenience will result
from its exercise.'
The time is overdue when a similar line of reasoning
should be employed in the State of North Dakota.
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